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Politics of this world: Protestant, evangelical, and Pentecostal movements in the Peru

riverEvangelicalism in Peru has become a driving force in politics and decision making across major subjects, such as gender-related policies and institutional power. But it’s relevance today in the current political landscape is only the result of a much larger process, one that started around the end of the nineteenth century, with the entrance of the first protestant denominations and the establishment of their grassroots across the country. In this podcast, professor Juan Fonseca aims to elaborate a brief history of Protestantism, in order to comprehend its current mainstream manifestation.

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A transcription of this interview is also available, and has been pasted below.


Podcast with Juan Fonseca

Interviewed by Sidney Castillo.

Transcribed by Helen Bradstock  and revised by  Sidney Castillo.

Sidney Castillo (SC): Professor Juan Fonseca is Licentiate in History for Pontificia Universidad Catholica del Peru. He’s also Master in History at this university. His work focuses on the historical development of non-Catholic Christian movements in Peru, mainly Protestant evangelical, and intertwined with an interest in politics and social movements. Welcome Professor Fonseca to the Religious Studies Project.

Juan Fonseca (JF): It’s a pleasure to speak with you.

SC: The pleasure is also ours. Now, we’re here to learn some things about the non-Catholic Christian movements in Peru. In order to do that we would like to know a bit more about the classification of these movements. Since the Protestant and Pentecostal landscape of Peru is, counterintuitively enough, a diverse one in terms of origins, theology and political tendencies, based on your previous research, would you please elaborate a brief specification of these movements?

JF: Of course. In my last writings I have raised a typology of Protestantism. This typology is based in the following aspects. First its historical roots – national level and worldwide level – and some interreligious characteristics, that is to say, the beliefs and the religious practices that make them singular within the set-up of Christianity.

SC: Mmm

JF: This includes. . . There’s two things. There is theology and there are ecumenical practices: a type of religiousness practised by these members.

SC: OK.

JF: And third is the religious emphasis, which includes the ways that this person is articulated in the public sphere. For example, their political attitudes, some of attitudes towards social practices and some ideological points. Moreover, I believe that Protestant and Pentecostal are like two specific faces within Peruvian Christianity. These two faces co-exist in Peru, within the non-Catholic population. These two groups share some theological characteristics, but also they reference the Bible to define the dogma. However, there is a fundamental difference between the symbolic epistemology that constitutes the basis on which the religious practices – or the religious devotes – are constructed. On the one hand Protestantism, which is basically rational religion sustained in the Bible. On the other hand Pentecostalism is a sensorial religion, sustained in the constant intense experience with the numinous. Protestantism is like a religion of modernity, Pentecostalism is a religion of post-modernity and, in this sense, Catholicism is like a religion from pre-modernity. (5:00) About this theoretical base I suggest the following typology. So, two big groups: Protestantism itself and Pentecostalism. In Protestantism itself we can distinguish two groups: mainline Protestantism and evangelical Protestantism. Mainline Protestantism, for example, includes churches like Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian. These churches have a very ecumenical attitude and missiology. Their theology is liberal and their political attitudes are very progressive. And the evangelical group includes some churches, for example, the Christian Missionary Alliance, The Nazareth Church, The Baptist Church, the Anabaptist Church. And their theology is more moderate, not necessarily liberal. Its political attitudes are moderate: centre-right or centre-left. And in the Pentecostal sphere we can distinguish two groups: classic Pentecostalism, for example, some churches like Assemblies of God, Church of God. Pentecostal churches in general, in this field, their theology is more conservative, sometimes fundamentalist. Its religiosity is very pietistic and its political attitudes are more conservative. And the last group, inside Pentecostalism, is the charismatic churches. The charismatic churches, for example include very large Christian communities: Agua Viva is a very large community here in Lima; and Camino de Vida; Emmanuel Church – the Church of Humberto Lay, who is a very outstanding evangelical congressman. These churches are very enthusiastic. Their religion is very conservative theology but these churches have very good work in politics, too, very effective work. But with politics, they’re very conservative, too. So they’re sometimes linked to the political right and their morals are very conservative. I think this is the spectrum, like you said.

SC: That’s a very interesting present-day analysis. But as a historian you, of course, have researched about the very beginnings of non-Catholic denominations in Peru. In that sense especially, what was the relationship between the first wave of Protestant missions and the social movements or institutions that were present in first years of the twentieth century? We could name some like indigenism, syndicate movement, student movement or feminists.

JF: On the one hand, the brothers and missionaries of the early decades of the twentieth century developed a strategy combining the following aspects. (10:00) First, a political objective: the decline of the power of the Catholic Church, which will coincide with the most progressive sectors in different periods. Second, a cultural offer: the Protestants as carriers of civilisation in which they will also receive the support of the liberals. And third, a religious agenda: Protestantism as a confessional eternity programme. Well this strategy was based, on the other hand, in the countries from which it came. In the United States, their so-called social gospel had a strong influence on the missionary group – particularly the Methodists, which is the third denomination in Peru. Although, the more conservative groups such as evangelicals from Great Britain, or other places, had the most pietistic disposition. But they were also clear that socialisation was part of their mission. On that basis, they developed a series of missionary initiatives in the social sphere. For instance: the development of the employment option for women; promoting female employment and education in their schools; or fostering the development of the nursing profession, which at that time was only confined to Catholic nuns. In addition, it is well known the link of the Protestant missionaries with the first leaders of the Peruvian feminism, such as Maria Alvarado. In fact, one of the very old Methodist schools – Lima High School – is Maria Alvarado School. Furthermore, they developed links with indigenous people, several of whose leaders – Manuel Vincente Villarán, Dora Mayer de Zulen – expressed their appreciation for the help with this work. Similarly Protestant missionaries developed some missionary projects within areas such as: the Amazonas,with the Awajún people; or in the Perené, with the Asháninka people; or Puno, with the Aymara people; with the Azangaro people of Puno; and in the area of trade unions and the university movement. The closeness between the Methodist pastor Roberto Alcorta and workers and the labour movements are well-known. In fact, Roberto Alcorta was part of the temperance movement in the beginning of the twentieth century. John A. Mackay, the very renowned Scottish educator, had the very closest links within circles of intellectualism in Lima, in the 1920s. In addition, Presbyterians of the Peruvian school had very close link with some intellectuals and politicians like Victor Raul Haya de la Torre,  Jose Carlos Mariátegui and Victor Andrés Belaúnde.

SC: Now, you talked about the intellectual movements linked with the Christian denominations and all theses initiatives were properly from the first decades of the twentieth century Peru. But nowadays you could trace a little bit from the mid twentieth century, there’s a change in the way that these denominations do pastoral work. In that sense, I would like to ask you . . . .Your research shows that these first waves of Protestant missionaries were agents of modernization, directing their work to many institutions and social groups. But it also refers that in the last fifty years a great portion of Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal denominations aligned themselves with more conservative ideas and political parties. When and why, would you say, is the turning point for this particular way of doing missionary work and overall being Protestant, evangelical or Pentecostal?

JF: (15:00) Well, I think that transformations of social approaches of missionaries started around the 1940s. On the one hand, the global context at this stage of the post-war period and the beginnings of the cold war influenced the conservatism of the Protestant churches. Thus, since the 1950s, new waves of missionaries with an anti-communist mentality and with a pietistic missiological approach focussed basically on proselytising and the spiritualisation of the Christian missions when they arrived. In China, there was a communist revolution during 1940-49 so, two years after, all the protestant missionaries were expelled. Like ten thousand, so most of them came to Latin America with very anti-communist ideas. This was going to be acute in the following case when they were from nations of ideological Christian progressivism: communism, versus the Christian evangelical conservatives who were there. These troubles between the conservative majority and the progressive minority – mainly grouped in the Methodist church and the Christian NGOs – began in the ’60s. Similar to what happened with Catholicism, the nature of the debate was focussed on the ideological dimensions of the Christian mission in communism. In the ’70s, it was clear that theological conservatism had been imposed, but in a moderate version, whose best expression was the Latin American Theological Fraternity, and the Association of Evangelical College Groups of Peru (AGEUP in Spanish). At the side of it, the great evangelical mass – people attached to large denominations – basically developed pietistic religious practices and a fundamentalist hermeneutic. And on the other hand, the complex process of nationalisation of the leadership of the Protestant denominations of course, in that context, just when conservative speech and fundamentalism was in progress. Obviously, that explains why many of the protestant national leadership took a conservative, anti-ecumenical and even fundamentalist speech. So the CONEP (in Spanish): the National Council of Evangelical Churches starts its activities in the 1940s. And the CONEP was, well, the leadership of CONEP was very national – national people. They became institutionally independent but they inherited the ideological imprint of the missionaries from whom they complained. Thus, as we enter into the 1980s the field was ready for the emergence of fundamentalism. Somehow a violence of terrorism delayed that process for a short while, because moderate evangelicalism made this speech, hegemonize at least in evangelical cooperation entities and especially in CONEP, the Evangelical National Council of Peru. Since then, most of their leaders have belonged to the moderate evangelicalism. However, this hegemony began to be questioned by a growing and very well organised fundamentalist force, which caused a big crisis in CONEP. (20:00) So this neo-fundamentalism, represented in the leaders of the charismatic movement, was different from moderate evangelicalism in its mission of the church, and its political ideology. Neo-fundamentalism is not necessarily anti-intellectual. You can even say that it is relatively illustrated and fits very well into the parameters of the democratic party sphere. This neo-fundamentalism is very active, politically speaking, always a part of the agenda of right-wing political groups. Between 1993 and 1995 an outpost of this group decided to take control of CONEP. The damage that this battle produced in the main evangelical institutions was prolonged, although later on the moderate groups would take control of the situation. But the neo-fundamentalists empowered themselves and began to construct the spaces of collective institutions on the basis of which, they would promote their agenda. Thus FIPAC – the International Fraternity of Christian Pastors and the Peruvian Fellowship of Evangelical Pastors – were developed. These institutions are very conservative, very fundamentalist. So throughout the 21st century the strength of neo-fundamentalism and conservative groups has continued to grow. CONEP has been the battlefield between the ultra-conservative groups and the moderate minority that still maintains its presence here. Sometimes CONEP seems a very strange institution, because their presidents – these last years – were always moderate, or even liberal pastors, but when they took the presidency, immediately they acted like prisoners of the conservatives. So the CONEP people say, “Well the president is liberal.” But it’s just a symbolic position, they have no power, no effective power inside the institution. So the UNICEP, the formation of the Union of Christian Evangelical Churches, its partner institutions, different from CONEP, begin a new attempt by the right-wing evangelical groups to hegemonise their reactionary speech. So, an additional factor in this brief history is the influence of the American neo-conservative agenda – the North American conservative agenda. Since the 1980s, the right-wing religious parties have been strengthened considerably in the United States and is globalized in the last decade. So, the objectives of the crusade to the demands of sexual minorities, feminism, and secularism in general, and for a decade their actions have become globalized. I think it is one of the protagonists of, for example, homophobic speech and the practice of Christian conservatism in Peru.

SC: As you may know, on March 12 2016, La Marcha por la Familia y la Vida, or March for Life and Family took place. It is an annual international march organised by the Archdiocese of Lima and gathers most of the conservative Christian and political wings of Peruvian civil society against abortion and same-sex unions. In that sense, what is the current impact of the Pentecostal and evangelical movement as part of a wider conservative coalition in these political struggles. (25:00) Also, why would you say are they so focused on these particular issues?

JF: At present, it is clear that neo-fundamentalists have managed to hegemonise at least on this point. On the Catholic side, the statement of the Episcopal Conference, the Bishop’s Conference, have been clearly reactionary. And at this point, all the wings of the Catholic church handle the same speech, at least publicly. Progressive groups are afraid of saying something for fear or for indifference. Well, but on the Protestant evangelical side, the internal battles which have occurred in the past few years about this subject also show that the neo-fundamentalist speech succeeded in cornering moderates and progressives, in a way that they had to abide to the falling tide, which at this time has been extended by the evangelical churches. The neo-fundamentalists have succeeded in associating their speech with the essentiality of the evangelical identity. I think that the Protestant evangelical members, their identity did not necessarily imply being, for example, homophobic. Thus part of the conservative strategy was to normalise and naturalise the relationship between evangelical religious discourse and fierce opposition to sexual diversity or abortion, and other issues like this. The conservative pressure has been so strong that it has managed to neutralise almost all voices inside the local Protestantism, that began to show some sympathy to the LGBT cause. They have gone with unethical methods many times, but have finally been effective. For example, the campaign for recall of Susana Villarán[1] ecognised the conflict of powers in which the neo-fundamentalists won and important repositioning. There are some similar areas affecting this outbreak of homophobic speech and religious practice of conservative Christianity. On the one hand, theology and Biblical hermeneutics produce the ideological conditions for the constitution of pastoral homophobic discourse to the interior of the churches. On the other hand, the political discourse of religious hierarchies in the public sphere is more and more careful with using religious categories except for less sophisticated groups. Finally, in practice, this trans-confessional alliance of neo-conservatism, or “ecumenical fundamentalism”, has a more active set of actors who are positioned in the various political groupings within the country, as well as in social spaces. Traditionally, they were reluctant to change, for example, the location of the militant institutions. However, the progressive minority, silenced for decades, also begins to build a theological discourse where the practice of the faith are compatible with promotion of sexual diversity rights or some other issues of progressive agenda.

SC: (30:00) Well, now that we have covered the conservative part, I’d like to go to the other side of the spectrum with this the next question. Now we’re facing the second round of presidential elections – on June 5, 2016. While there is a common misconception that being Christian equals being a political conservative – thus favouring religious and secular conservative candidates – a recent statement of an interdenominational Christian collective, favouring a left wing candidate, has been circulated in different social media. Why these kind of political stances hardly find any correspondences in the majority of Peruvian Christians?

JF: Well, I’m not sure that this manifest of progressive Christians, on which I include myself as well, has impacted too much on the electoral decisions of evangelical voters. I think the evangelical voter is more independent than many people believe and votes according to rationales that are not always religious. However I think that, actually, there is an ultra-conservative fundamentalist core that is militant in the anti-rights crusade that its hierarchies have initiated. Although it is a minority, it is very powerful in its media presence. They have managed, as I said, to naturalise the relationship between the Gospel and the conservative media and public opinion in general. Well, in that context, progressive evangelical voices are even less than the fundamentalists, but hold key positions in evangelical institutions, for example the CONEP, the Bible Society, Christian NGOs, some seminaries and even some denominations. In that sense, I think the dissemination of the pronouncements of Christians in favour of Veronika, the left-wing candidate, is a very positive step. Because it shows that some of them are already learning to position themselves in the public debate with the same aggressiveness as conservatives, and articulated with national political actors, in this case, with the left-wing Frente Amplio. In that way, I think that an interesting way has been marked so that, in the future, progressive positions expand their capacity of incidence within the churches and also in Peruvian society in general. And I think it’s very possible.

SC: Well, Professor Fonseca, it has been a pleasure to have you here on the Religious Studies Project. We have learnt a lot about non-Catholic Christian movements that are in our country for more than a century now.

JF: Well thanks for this opportunity.

SC: See you next time.

[1] The mayor of Lima during the period 2011-2014. She was indicted in a widely mediatic process for being, alledgedly, inefficient as a public official. During that process, the several conservative Christian denominations came out to denounce the former mayor for being pro-LGBT rights, since several of her public policies targeted sexual minorities, sex workers, and the like. [Note added by SC]


Citation Info: Fonseca, Juan 2017. “Politics of This World: Protestant, Evangelical and Pentecostal Movements in Peru”, The Religious Studies Project (Podcast Transcript). 17 April 2017. Transcribed by Helen Bradstock. Version 1.2, 1 May 2017. Available at: https://www.religiousstudiesproject.com/podcast/politics-of-this-world-protestant-evangelical-and-pentecostal-movements-in-the-peru/

All transcriptions for THE RELIGIOUS STUDIES PROJECT are currently produced by volunteers. If you spot any errors in this transcription, please let us know at editors@religiousstudiesproject.com. If you would be willing to help with these efforts, or know of any sources of funding for the broader transcription project, please get in touch. Thanks for reading.

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The Faith of the Killable: A Faith for Empowerment?

As one listens to Dr. Johnson describe the high homicide rates of Río de Janeiro, the gap in between the haves and the have nots, as well as the appalling conditions he witnessed –through use of an admirable methodology– in this city’s prison system, something that stands out clearly is how all these elements are strongly concatenated as pieces of the same dehumanizing setting. It’s not a coincidence that, in several countries within Latin America, scandalous levels of inequality coexist with elevated delinquency rates. Francois Bourguignon (1999) stated that, in developing countries, crime and violence are likely to be a socially costly by-product of, among other factors, uneven or irregular economic development processes, and affirmed that economic theory shows how property crime and, in general, all the violence associated with illegal activity may in part be the consequence of extreme inequality and poverty. This framework of socioeconomic disparity and violence is key to understand how entire population sectors in Río become and remain killable people, and to assess the serious restraints that inmates who proceed from these sectors will face again, once their time in prison is finished. Dr. Johnson refers to Pentecostalism as the faith of the killable and suggests that one of the reasons why Pentecostalism succeeds among those who come from impoverished areas –which is the case of many inmates in Río’s prison system– is that “it can empower people who are, otherwise, thrown into the edges”. In this response, I would like to argue that, in order to appreciate to what extent Pentecostalism could be considered empowering, it’s pertinent to take a look at its impacts (or absence of impacts) in the social context of those who convert to this faith.

Ignacio Martín-Baró (1998) stated that religious conversion has important social implications –even if each person experiences it as an individual process– and that, although conversion brings the knowledge of a new meaning that can make individual life more rewarding, this new meaning can either separate people from their social reality and history, or it can make people become more aware of that reality and turn them into subjects of their own history. Martín-Baró also proposed that the individual motivations for religious conversion acquire a wider historical meaning when they are situated in the net of social forces that affect a person, which can be humanizing or dehumanizing. Taking this into account, if we seek to estimate the empowerment potential of the conversion and affiliation to Pentecostal churches among the inmates of Rio’s prison system, it would be valuable to situate these events in a social background and to inquire: are these conversions able to generate only individual changes in the inmates, or do they also confer on them any resources to bring a positive contribution in the dynamics of their marginalized communities?

Recent research conducted in Central America has attempted to answer a similar question, and has explored the impact of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements on communitarian organization and civic participation. In the case of a traditional Pentecostal church, studied in El Salvador, the research results showed that this faith community conferred high importance upon evangelization and to the individual changes derived from religious conversion, as ways of making a contribution to society; an individualistic view was also present in the way this church interpreted the causes of social problems and in the type of solutions that they considered effective to confront them. In addition, they proved to give utmost importance to the involvement of their members in activities that belonged mostly to the private sphere, without encouraging their interest in the public sphere. Regarding the communitarian participation and political attitudes of the members of this church, it was interesting to find that, from the four faith communities that were studied and compared in El Salvador, the traditional Pentecostals reported the least favorable attitude to political participation in general, the lowest willingness to join political parties or to take over public positions, the strongest reluctance to take part in demonstrations, and a scarce participation in initiatives of their neighborhoods and municipalities. These results, of course, show only coexistence between some religiosity traits and political attitudes –not a cause-effect relation between them– but they suggest that the emphasis this Pentecostal church placed on individual change and on the private space participation didn’t offer favorable conditions for its members to recognize the importance of being active in communitarian organizations and articulating efforts with other citizens to pursue collective goals.

It can be useful to take into account these findings as we go back to considering the social impacts that would be reasonable to expect from the conversion of the inmates in Río´s prison system and from their affiliation to Pentecostal churches. In this sense, it would be interesting to analyze if what Dr. Johnson could observe in the prison churches provided reasons to anticipate that the inmates will, in the future, promote changes beyond their individual behavior and beyond the private space in which religious practice often takes place. For example, Dr. Johnson mentioned that personal testimony and tangible changes in personal behavior were a priority for those who had converted, especially in the case of those who had retired from gangs. When these inmates return to their neighborhoods, will this emphasis on the individual transformation be helpful or not for them to become aware of the structural causes of the deplorable conditions experienced in their communities, and the importance of collective solutions for development? Also, Dr. Johnson explains that Pentecostalism offers a platform for a strong identity and even the opportunity to assume leadership in the autonomous churches that exist inside prisons. Therefore, could the inmates’ experience as leaders in the private space increase their willingness to subsequently become active in community organizations?

The answers to these questions are also essential in regard to after-imprisonment reinsertion and relapse prevention because, if the context to which the inmates return is not improved in any way, it will continue exposing them to social exclusion, translated, among other elements, in deficient education opportunities and difficulties incorporating into labor life, two of the structural causes of the criminality epidemic in Latin America (Kliksberg 2008). In the particular case of inmates who previously belonged to gangs, this complex scenario demands that reinsertion initiatives –including those promoted by religious entities– have a holistic approach that transcends the pursuit of individual change; such initiatives have to be articulated, and coordinated with different resources and efforts, in order to impact the individuals, their families and closest relationships, but also the public spaces, the access to employment, the neighborhoods and communities, and the cultural, social and economic factors that contribute to violence (Aguilar and Miranda 2006).

In sum, affiliation with Pentecostal churches in Río de Janeiro’s prison system can certainly offer important benefits to the inmates in the hostile and dangerous situation that their imprisonment represents. Nonetheless, the transformation promoted by these churches could be very limited if it remains circumscribed to the individuals and those who are closer to them, without helping the inmates to understand and modify the social dynamics that keep them marginalized. This kind of empowerment is only relative if it gives people means to recover a sense of dignity in their lives but not necessarily to stop being killable.

References

Aguilar, J., & Miranda, L. (2006). Entre la articulación y la competencia: las respuestas de la sociedad civil organizada a las pandillas en El Salvador. In Cruz, J.M. (ed.) Maras y Pandillas en Centroamérica, Vol. 4. San Salvador: UCA Editores.

Bourguignon, F. (1999). Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: A Review Focusing on Developing Countries. Desarrollo y Sociedad, 44, 61-99.

Kliksberg, B. (2008). ¿Cómo enfrentar la inseguridad en América Latina?. Nueva Sociedad, 215, 4-16.

Martín-Baró, I. (1998). Religión y guerra psicológica. In Blanco, A. (ed.) Psicología de la Liberación. Madrid: Trotta.

Os serés matáves: Pentecostalism in the Prisons of Rio

BRASIL-997Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a city of over six million people; it is known for its exotic nightlife, white sand beaches, crystal blue water, and of course, one of the most famous bosa nova songs ever: The Girl From Ipanema. However, beyond the sunny beaches, veritable entertainment, and soothing music lies a very different scene – the Rio de Janeiro prison system. Inside the towering grey concrete walls live Rio’s os serés matáves, or roughly translated into English as, “the killable people”These “killable people” are comprised mostly of proletariat and unemployed minorities with crimes ranging from the benign to the bloody. Gangs rule the prison and every day at 6 pm deafening war cries echo out from within the concrete walls as prison gangs scream allegiance to their “commander” – the head gang leader who runs the prison. The guards largely remain on the outskirts of the prison, they don’t control much of what happens within, as it is too dangerous to go inside. [Note: While the prison system is, of course, very dangerous, the guards’ absence is also due to the penology practiced in that country.]

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Dr. Johnson inside the prison with other inmates during worship.

For Brazil’s “killable people”, there are two prevalent ways to deal with the relative hell of prison – both involving allegiance and devotion. You can give your life to the gang or give your life to God. Only three types of people dare to venture into the heart of a Rio de Janeiro prison: the condemned, the pentecostal pastors leading the prison ministry, and curiously brave sociologists such as Dr. Andrew Johnson.

 

BRASIL-1017-1

In his interview with Thomas J. Coleman III, Dr. Johnson begins by discussing the preparation leading up to his ethnography of the Pentecostal prison ministries in Rio de Janero Brazil. He takes the listener through the streets and slums of Rio, and into a prison cell-block. Here, we learn about the gang life that largely runs the prison, and the “gang like” life (Pentecostal prison ministries) that can provide a temporary escape from the physically and psychologically damaging conditions of the jail, and might just provide eternal redemption through the faith of the pious prisoner. Johnson discusses the role of politics in the prison system, why Pentecostalism dominates the jails in a predominately catholic country such as Brazil, and “answers” the question of how to tell if someone is truly faithful. He discusses how prisoners are viewed by their community after their release, and upon conversion as an allegedly devout pentecostal. In closing, Dr. Johnson speculates about the future of pentecostal prison ministries in Brazil, and argues for “the religious lives of inmates being taken seriously apart from recidivism rates”.

Be sure to check out Dr. Johnson’s plenary address, the world debut of his documentary If I Give My Soul, at the 2014 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion conference in Indianapolis Indiana October 31st – November 2nd. You can register for the conference here: SSSR registration link.

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Politics of this world: Protestant, evangelical, and Pentecostal movements in the Peru

riverEvangelicalism in Peru has become a driving force in politics and decision making across major subjects, such as gender-related policies and institutional power. But it’s relevance today in the current political landscape is only the result of a much larger process, one that started around the end of the nineteenth century, with the entrance of the first protestant denominations and the establishment of their grassroots across the country. In this podcast, professor Juan Fonseca aims to elaborate a brief history of Protestantism, in order to comprehend its current mainstream manifestation.

You can download this interview, and subscribe to receive our weekly podcast, on iTunes. If you enjoyed it, please take a moment to rate us. And remember, you can use our Amazon.co.ukAmazon.com, or Amazon.ca links to support us at no additional cost when buying academic texts, Q-tips, and more.


A transcription of this interview is also available, and has been pasted below.


Podcast with Juan Fonseca

Interviewed by Sidney Castillo.

Transcribed by Helen Bradstock  and revised by  Sidney Castillo.

Sidney Castillo (SC): Professor Juan Fonseca is Licentiate in History for Pontificia Universidad Catholica del Peru. He’s also Master in History at this university. His work focuses on the historical development of non-Catholic Christian movements in Peru, mainly Protestant evangelical, and intertwined with an interest in politics and social movements. Welcome Professor Fonseca to the Religious Studies Project.

Juan Fonseca (JF): It’s a pleasure to speak with you.

SC: The pleasure is also ours. Now, we’re here to learn some things about the non-Catholic Christian movements in Peru. In order to do that we would like to know a bit more about the classification of these movements. Since the Protestant and Pentecostal landscape of Peru is, counterintuitively enough, a diverse one in terms of origins, theology and political tendencies, based on your previous research, would you please elaborate a brief specification of these movements?

JF: Of course. In my last writings I have raised a typology of Protestantism. This typology is based in the following aspects. First its historical roots – national level and worldwide level – and some interreligious characteristics, that is to say, the beliefs and the religious practices that make them singular within the set-up of Christianity.

SC: Mmm

JF: This includes. . . There’s two things. There is theology and there are ecumenical practices: a type of religiousness practised by these members.

SC: OK.

JF: And third is the religious emphasis, which includes the ways that this person is articulated in the public sphere. For example, their political attitudes, some of attitudes towards social practices and some ideological points. Moreover, I believe that Protestant and Pentecostal are like two specific faces within Peruvian Christianity. These two faces co-exist in Peru, within the non-Catholic population. These two groups share some theological characteristics, but also they reference the Bible to define the dogma. However, there is a fundamental difference between the symbolic epistemology that constitutes the basis on which the religious practices – or the religious devotes – are constructed. On the one hand Protestantism, which is basically rational religion sustained in the Bible. On the other hand Pentecostalism is a sensorial religion, sustained in the constant intense experience with the numinous. Protestantism is like a religion of modernity, Pentecostalism is a religion of post-modernity and, in this sense, Catholicism is like a religion from pre-modernity. (5:00) About this theoretical base I suggest the following typology. So, two big groups: Protestantism itself and Pentecostalism. In Protestantism itself we can distinguish two groups: mainline Protestantism and evangelical Protestantism. Mainline Protestantism, for example, includes churches like Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian. These churches have a very ecumenical attitude and missiology. Their theology is liberal and their political attitudes are very progressive. And the evangelical group includes some churches, for example, the Christian Missionary Alliance, The Nazareth Church, The Baptist Church, the Anabaptist Church. And their theology is more moderate, not necessarily liberal. Its political attitudes are moderate: centre-right or centre-left. And in the Pentecostal sphere we can distinguish two groups: classic Pentecostalism, for example, some churches like Assemblies of God, Church of God. Pentecostal churches in general, in this field, their theology is more conservative, sometimes fundamentalist. Its religiosity is very pietistic and its political attitudes are more conservative. And the last group, inside Pentecostalism, is the charismatic churches. The charismatic churches, for example include very large Christian communities: Agua Viva is a very large community here in Lima; and Camino de Vida; Emmanuel Church – the Church of Humberto Lay, who is a very outstanding evangelical congressman. These churches are very enthusiastic. Their religion is very conservative theology but these churches have very good work in politics, too, very effective work. But with politics, they’re very conservative, too. So they’re sometimes linked to the political right and their morals are very conservative. I think this is the spectrum, like you said.

SC: That’s a very interesting present-day analysis. But as a historian you, of course, have researched about the very beginnings of non-Catholic denominations in Peru. In that sense especially, what was the relationship between the first wave of Protestant missions and the social movements or institutions that were present in first years of the twentieth century? We could name some like indigenism, syndicate movement, student movement or feminists.

JF: On the one hand, the brothers and missionaries of the early decades of the twentieth century developed a strategy combining the following aspects. (10:00) First, a political objective: the decline of the power of the Catholic Church, which will coincide with the most progressive sectors in different periods. Second, a cultural offer: the Protestants as carriers of civilisation in which they will also receive the support of the liberals. And third, a religious agenda: Protestantism as a confessional eternity programme. Well this strategy was based, on the other hand, in the countries from which it came. In the United States, their so-called social gospel had a strong influence on the missionary group – particularly the Methodists, which is the third denomination in Peru. Although, the more conservative groups such as evangelicals from Great Britain, or other places, had the most pietistic disposition. But they were also clear that socialisation was part of their mission. On that basis, they developed a series of missionary initiatives in the social sphere. For instance: the development of the employment option for women; promoting female employment and education in their schools; or fostering the development of the nursing profession, which at that time was only confined to Catholic nuns. In addition, it is well known the link of the Protestant missionaries with the first leaders of the Peruvian feminism, such as Maria Alvarado. In fact, one of the very old Methodist schools – Lima High School – is Maria Alvarado School. Furthermore, they developed links with indigenous people, several of whose leaders – Manuel Vincente Villarán, Dora Mayer de Zulen – expressed their appreciation for the help with this work. Similarly Protestant missionaries developed some missionary projects within areas such as: the Amazonas,with the Awajún people; or in the Perené, with the Asháninka people; or Puno, with the Aymara people; with the Azangaro people of Puno; and in the area of trade unions and the university movement. The closeness between the Methodist pastor Roberto Alcorta and workers and the labour movements are well-known. In fact, Roberto Alcorta was part of the temperance movement in the beginning of the twentieth century. John A. Mackay, the very renowned Scottish educator, had the very closest links within circles of intellectualism in Lima, in the 1920s. In addition, Presbyterians of the Peruvian school had very close link with some intellectuals and politicians like Victor Raul Haya de la Torre,  Jose Carlos Mariátegui and Victor Andrés Belaúnde.

SC: Now, you talked about the intellectual movements linked with the Christian denominations and all theses initiatives were properly from the first decades of the twentieth century Peru. But nowadays you could trace a little bit from the mid twentieth century, there’s a change in the way that these denominations do pastoral work. In that sense, I would like to ask you . . . .Your research shows that these first waves of Protestant missionaries were agents of modernization, directing their work to many institutions and social groups. But it also refers that in the last fifty years a great portion of Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal denominations aligned themselves with more conservative ideas and political parties. When and why, would you say, is the turning point for this particular way of doing missionary work and overall being Protestant, evangelical or Pentecostal?

JF: (15:00) Well, I think that transformations of social approaches of missionaries started around the 1940s. On the one hand, the global context at this stage of the post-war period and the beginnings of the cold war influenced the conservatism of the Protestant churches. Thus, since the 1950s, new waves of missionaries with an anti-communist mentality and with a pietistic missiological approach focussed basically on proselytising and the spiritualisation of the Christian missions when they arrived. In China, there was a communist revolution during 1940-49 so, two years after, all the protestant missionaries were expelled. Like ten thousand, so most of them came to Latin America with very anti-communist ideas. This was going to be acute in the following case when they were from nations of ideological Christian progressivism: communism, versus the Christian evangelical conservatives who were there. These troubles between the conservative majority and the progressive minority – mainly grouped in the Methodist church and the Christian NGOs – began in the ’60s. Similar to what happened with Catholicism, the nature of the debate was focussed on the ideological dimensions of the Christian mission in communism. In the ’70s, it was clear that theological conservatism had been imposed, but in a moderate version, whose best expression was the Latin American Theological Fraternity, and the Association of Evangelical College Groups of Peru (AGEUP in Spanish). At the side of it, the great evangelical mass – people attached to large denominations – basically developed pietistic religious practices and a fundamentalist hermeneutic. And on the other hand, the complex process of nationalisation of the leadership of the Protestant denominations of course, in that context, just when conservative speech and fundamentalism was in progress. Obviously, that explains why many of the protestant national leadership took a conservative, anti-ecumenical and even fundamentalist speech. So the CONEP (in Spanish): the National Council of Evangelical Churches starts its activities in the 1940s. And the CONEP was, well, the leadership of CONEP was very national – national people. They became institutionally independent but they inherited the ideological imprint of the missionaries from whom they complained. Thus, as we enter into the 1980s the field was ready for the emergence of fundamentalism. Somehow a violence of terrorism delayed that process for a short while, because moderate evangelicalism made this speech, hegemonize at least in evangelical cooperation entities and especially in CONEP, the Evangelical National Council of Peru. Since then, most of their leaders have belonged to the moderate evangelicalism. However, this hegemony began to be questioned by a growing and very well organised fundamentalist force, which caused a big crisis in CONEP. (20:00) So this neo-fundamentalism, represented in the leaders of the charismatic movement, was different from moderate evangelicalism in its mission of the church, and its political ideology. Neo-fundamentalism is not necessarily anti-intellectual. You can even say that it is relatively illustrated and fits very well into the parameters of the democratic party sphere. This neo-fundamentalism is very active, politically speaking, always a part of the agenda of right-wing political groups. Between 1993 and 1995 an outpost of this group decided to take control of CONEP. The damage that this battle produced in the main evangelical institutions was prolonged, although later on the moderate groups would take control of the situation. But the neo-fundamentalists empowered themselves and began to construct the spaces of collective institutions on the basis of which, they would promote their agenda. Thus FIPAC – the International Fraternity of Christian Pastors and the Peruvian Fellowship of Evangelical Pastors – were developed. These institutions are very conservative, very fundamentalist. So throughout the 21st century the strength of neo-fundamentalism and conservative groups has continued to grow. CONEP has been the battlefield between the ultra-conservative groups and the moderate minority that still maintains its presence here. Sometimes CONEP seems a very strange institution, because their presidents – these last years – were always moderate, or even liberal pastors, but when they took the presidency, immediately they acted like prisoners of the conservatives. So the CONEP people say, “Well the president is liberal.” But it’s just a symbolic position, they have no power, no effective power inside the institution. So the UNICEP, the formation of the Union of Christian Evangelical Churches, its partner institutions, different from CONEP, begin a new attempt by the right-wing evangelical groups to hegemonise their reactionary speech. So, an additional factor in this brief history is the influence of the American neo-conservative agenda – the North American conservative agenda. Since the 1980s, the right-wing religious parties have been strengthened considerably in the United States and is globalized in the last decade. So, the objectives of the crusade to the demands of sexual minorities, feminism, and secularism in general, and for a decade their actions have become globalized. I think it is one of the protagonists of, for example, homophobic speech and the practice of Christian conservatism in Peru.

SC: As you may know, on March 12 2016, La Marcha por la Familia y la Vida, or March for Life and Family took place. It is an annual international march organised by the Archdiocese of Lima and gathers most of the conservative Christian and political wings of Peruvian civil society against abortion and same-sex unions. In that sense, what is the current impact of the Pentecostal and evangelical movement as part of a wider conservative coalition in these political struggles. (25:00) Also, why would you say are they so focused on these particular issues?

JF: At present, it is clear that neo-fundamentalists have managed to hegemonise at least on this point. On the Catholic side, the statement of the Episcopal Conference, the Bishop’s Conference, have been clearly reactionary. And at this point, all the wings of the Catholic church handle the same speech, at least publicly. Progressive groups are afraid of saying something for fear or for indifference. Well, but on the Protestant evangelical side, the internal battles which have occurred in the past few years about this subject also show that the neo-fundamentalist speech succeeded in cornering moderates and progressives, in a way that they had to abide to the falling tide, which at this time has been extended by the evangelical churches. The neo-fundamentalists have succeeded in associating their speech with the essentiality of the evangelical identity. I think that the Protestant evangelical members, their identity did not necessarily imply being, for example, homophobic. Thus part of the conservative strategy was to normalise and naturalise the relationship between evangelical religious discourse and fierce opposition to sexual diversity or abortion, and other issues like this. The conservative pressure has been so strong that it has managed to neutralise almost all voices inside the local Protestantism, that began to show some sympathy to the LGBT cause. They have gone with unethical methods many times, but have finally been effective. For example, the campaign for recall of Susana Villarán[1] ecognised the conflict of powers in which the neo-fundamentalists won and important repositioning. There are some similar areas affecting this outbreak of homophobic speech and religious practice of conservative Christianity. On the one hand, theology and Biblical hermeneutics produce the ideological conditions for the constitution of pastoral homophobic discourse to the interior of the churches. On the other hand, the political discourse of religious hierarchies in the public sphere is more and more careful with using religious categories except for less sophisticated groups. Finally, in practice, this trans-confessional alliance of neo-conservatism, or “ecumenical fundamentalism”, has a more active set of actors who are positioned in the various political groupings within the country, as well as in social spaces. Traditionally, they were reluctant to change, for example, the location of the militant institutions. However, the progressive minority, silenced for decades, also begins to build a theological discourse where the practice of the faith are compatible with promotion of sexual diversity rights or some other issues of progressive agenda.

SC: (30:00) Well, now that we have covered the conservative part, I’d like to go to the other side of the spectrum with this the next question. Now we’re facing the second round of presidential elections – on June 5, 2016. While there is a common misconception that being Christian equals being a political conservative – thus favouring religious and secular conservative candidates – a recent statement of an interdenominational Christian collective, favouring a left wing candidate, has been circulated in different social media. Why these kind of political stances hardly find any correspondences in the majority of Peruvian Christians?

JF: Well, I’m not sure that this manifest of progressive Christians, on which I include myself as well, has impacted too much on the electoral decisions of evangelical voters. I think the evangelical voter is more independent than many people believe and votes according to rationales that are not always religious. However I think that, actually, there is an ultra-conservative fundamentalist core that is militant in the anti-rights crusade that its hierarchies have initiated. Although it is a minority, it is very powerful in its media presence. They have managed, as I said, to naturalise the relationship between the Gospel and the conservative media and public opinion in general. Well, in that context, progressive evangelical voices are even less than the fundamentalists, but hold key positions in evangelical institutions, for example the CONEP, the Bible Society, Christian NGOs, some seminaries and even some denominations. In that sense, I think the dissemination of the pronouncements of Christians in favour of Veronika, the left-wing candidate, is a very positive step. Because it shows that some of them are already learning to position themselves in the public debate with the same aggressiveness as conservatives, and articulated with national political actors, in this case, with the left-wing Frente Amplio. In that way, I think that an interesting way has been marked so that, in the future, progressive positions expand their capacity of incidence within the churches and also in Peruvian society in general. And I think it’s very possible.

SC: Well, Professor Fonseca, it has been a pleasure to have you here on the Religious Studies Project. We have learnt a lot about non-Catholic Christian movements that are in our country for more than a century now.

JF: Well thanks for this opportunity.

SC: See you next time.

[1] The mayor of Lima during the period 2011-2014. She was indicted in a widely mediatic process for being, alledgedly, inefficient as a public official. During that process, the several conservative Christian denominations came out to denounce the former mayor for being pro-LGBT rights, since several of her public policies targeted sexual minorities, sex workers, and the like. [Note added by SC]


Citation Info: Fonseca, Juan 2017. “Politics of This World: Protestant, Evangelical and Pentecostal Movements in Peru”, The Religious Studies Project (Podcast Transcript). 17 April 2017. Transcribed by Helen Bradstock. Version 1.2, 1 May 2017. Available at: https://www.religiousstudiesproject.com/podcast/politics-of-this-world-protestant-evangelical-and-pentecostal-movements-in-the-peru/

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The Faith of the Killable: A Faith for Empowerment?

As one listens to Dr. Johnson describe the high homicide rates of Río de Janeiro, the gap in between the haves and the have nots, as well as the appalling conditions he witnessed –through use of an admirable methodology– in this city’s prison system, something that stands out clearly is how all these elements are strongly concatenated as pieces of the same dehumanizing setting. It’s not a coincidence that, in several countries within Latin America, scandalous levels of inequality coexist with elevated delinquency rates. Francois Bourguignon (1999) stated that, in developing countries, crime and violence are likely to be a socially costly by-product of, among other factors, uneven or irregular economic development processes, and affirmed that economic theory shows how property crime and, in general, all the violence associated with illegal activity may in part be the consequence of extreme inequality and poverty. This framework of socioeconomic disparity and violence is key to understand how entire population sectors in Río become and remain killable people, and to assess the serious restraints that inmates who proceed from these sectors will face again, once their time in prison is finished. Dr. Johnson refers to Pentecostalism as the faith of the killable and suggests that one of the reasons why Pentecostalism succeeds among those who come from impoverished areas –which is the case of many inmates in Río’s prison system– is that “it can empower people who are, otherwise, thrown into the edges”. In this response, I would like to argue that, in order to appreciate to what extent Pentecostalism could be considered empowering, it’s pertinent to take a look at its impacts (or absence of impacts) in the social context of those who convert to this faith.

Ignacio Martín-Baró (1998) stated that religious conversion has important social implications –even if each person experiences it as an individual process– and that, although conversion brings the knowledge of a new meaning that can make individual life more rewarding, this new meaning can either separate people from their social reality and history, or it can make people become more aware of that reality and turn them into subjects of their own history. Martín-Baró also proposed that the individual motivations for religious conversion acquire a wider historical meaning when they are situated in the net of social forces that affect a person, which can be humanizing or dehumanizing. Taking this into account, if we seek to estimate the empowerment potential of the conversion and affiliation to Pentecostal churches among the inmates of Rio’s prison system, it would be valuable to situate these events in a social background and to inquire: are these conversions able to generate only individual changes in the inmates, or do they also confer on them any resources to bring a positive contribution in the dynamics of their marginalized communities?

Recent research conducted in Central America has attempted to answer a similar question, and has explored the impact of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements on communitarian organization and civic participation. In the case of a traditional Pentecostal church, studied in El Salvador, the research results showed that this faith community conferred high importance upon evangelization and to the individual changes derived from religious conversion, as ways of making a contribution to society; an individualistic view was also present in the way this church interpreted the causes of social problems and in the type of solutions that they considered effective to confront them. In addition, they proved to give utmost importance to the involvement of their members in activities that belonged mostly to the private sphere, without encouraging their interest in the public sphere. Regarding the communitarian participation and political attitudes of the members of this church, it was interesting to find that, from the four faith communities that were studied and compared in El Salvador, the traditional Pentecostals reported the least favorable attitude to political participation in general, the lowest willingness to join political parties or to take over public positions, the strongest reluctance to take part in demonstrations, and a scarce participation in initiatives of their neighborhoods and municipalities. These results, of course, show only coexistence between some religiosity traits and political attitudes –not a cause-effect relation between them– but they suggest that the emphasis this Pentecostal church placed on individual change and on the private space participation didn’t offer favorable conditions for its members to recognize the importance of being active in communitarian organizations and articulating efforts with other citizens to pursue collective goals.

It can be useful to take into account these findings as we go back to considering the social impacts that would be reasonable to expect from the conversion of the inmates in Río´s prison system and from their affiliation to Pentecostal churches. In this sense, it would be interesting to analyze if what Dr. Johnson could observe in the prison churches provided reasons to anticipate that the inmates will, in the future, promote changes beyond their individual behavior and beyond the private space in which religious practice often takes place. For example, Dr. Johnson mentioned that personal testimony and tangible changes in personal behavior were a priority for those who had converted, especially in the case of those who had retired from gangs. When these inmates return to their neighborhoods, will this emphasis on the individual transformation be helpful or not for them to become aware of the structural causes of the deplorable conditions experienced in their communities, and the importance of collective solutions for development? Also, Dr. Johnson explains that Pentecostalism offers a platform for a strong identity and even the opportunity to assume leadership in the autonomous churches that exist inside prisons. Therefore, could the inmates’ experience as leaders in the private space increase their willingness to subsequently become active in community organizations?

The answers to these questions are also essential in regard to after-imprisonment reinsertion and relapse prevention because, if the context to which the inmates return is not improved in any way, it will continue exposing them to social exclusion, translated, among other elements, in deficient education opportunities and difficulties incorporating into labor life, two of the structural causes of the criminality epidemic in Latin America (Kliksberg 2008). In the particular case of inmates who previously belonged to gangs, this complex scenario demands that reinsertion initiatives –including those promoted by religious entities– have a holistic approach that transcends the pursuit of individual change; such initiatives have to be articulated, and coordinated with different resources and efforts, in order to impact the individuals, their families and closest relationships, but also the public spaces, the access to employment, the neighborhoods and communities, and the cultural, social and economic factors that contribute to violence (Aguilar and Miranda 2006).

In sum, affiliation with Pentecostal churches in Río de Janeiro’s prison system can certainly offer important benefits to the inmates in the hostile and dangerous situation that their imprisonment represents. Nonetheless, the transformation promoted by these churches could be very limited if it remains circumscribed to the individuals and those who are closer to them, without helping the inmates to understand and modify the social dynamics that keep them marginalized. This kind of empowerment is only relative if it gives people means to recover a sense of dignity in their lives but not necessarily to stop being killable.

References

Aguilar, J., & Miranda, L. (2006). Entre la articulación y la competencia: las respuestas de la sociedad civil organizada a las pandillas en El Salvador. In Cruz, J.M. (ed.) Maras y Pandillas en Centroamérica, Vol. 4. San Salvador: UCA Editores.

Bourguignon, F. (1999). Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: A Review Focusing on Developing Countries. Desarrollo y Sociedad, 44, 61-99.

Kliksberg, B. (2008). ¿Cómo enfrentar la inseguridad en América Latina?. Nueva Sociedad, 215, 4-16.

Martín-Baró, I. (1998). Religión y guerra psicológica. In Blanco, A. (ed.) Psicología de la Liberación. Madrid: Trotta.

Os serés matáves: Pentecostalism in the Prisons of Rio

BRASIL-997Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a city of over six million people; it is known for its exotic nightlife, white sand beaches, crystal blue water, and of course, one of the most famous bosa nova songs ever: The Girl From Ipanema. However, beyond the sunny beaches, veritable entertainment, and soothing music lies a very different scene – the Rio de Janeiro prison system. Inside the towering grey concrete walls live Rio’s os serés matáves, or roughly translated into English as, “the killable people”These “killable people” are comprised mostly of proletariat and unemployed minorities with crimes ranging from the benign to the bloody. Gangs rule the prison and every day at 6 pm deafening war cries echo out from within the concrete walls as prison gangs scream allegiance to their “commander” – the head gang leader who runs the prison. The guards largely remain on the outskirts of the prison, they don’t control much of what happens within, as it is too dangerous to go inside. [Note: While the prison system is, of course, very dangerous, the guards’ absence is also due to the penology practiced in that country.]

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Dr. Johnson inside the prison with other inmates during worship.

For Brazil’s “killable people”, there are two prevalent ways to deal with the relative hell of prison – both involving allegiance and devotion. You can give your life to the gang or give your life to God. Only three types of people dare to venture into the heart of a Rio de Janeiro prison: the condemned, the pentecostal pastors leading the prison ministry, and curiously brave sociologists such as Dr. Andrew Johnson.

 

BRASIL-1017-1

In his interview with Thomas J. Coleman III, Dr. Johnson begins by discussing the preparation leading up to his ethnography of the Pentecostal prison ministries in Rio de Janero Brazil. He takes the listener through the streets and slums of Rio, and into a prison cell-block. Here, we learn about the gang life that largely runs the prison, and the “gang like” life (Pentecostal prison ministries) that can provide a temporary escape from the physically and psychologically damaging conditions of the jail, and might just provide eternal redemption through the faith of the pious prisoner. Johnson discusses the role of politics in the prison system, why Pentecostalism dominates the jails in a predominately catholic country such as Brazil, and “answers” the question of how to tell if someone is truly faithful. He discusses how prisoners are viewed by their community after their release, and upon conversion as an allegedly devout pentecostal. In closing, Dr. Johnson speculates about the future of pentecostal prison ministries in Brazil, and argues for “the religious lives of inmates being taken seriously apart from recidivism rates”.

Be sure to check out Dr. Johnson’s plenary address, the world debut of his documentary If I Give My Soul, at the 2014 Society for the Scientific Study of Religion conference in Indianapolis Indiana October 31st – November 2nd. You can register for the conference here: SSSR registration link.

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